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Corporate Cybersecurity: The
International Threat to Private
Networks and How Regulations Can
Mitigate It
ABSTRACT

Cyberattacks are occurring at an accelerating pace.

Foreign

nations are increasingly utilizing hacking as a tool for economic gain,
acts of aggression, or internationalpolitical expression. At risk are US
consumers'personaldata, private firms' bottom line, and the economies'
integrity. In response, federal and state lawmakers have issued a series
of disparate, uncoordinatedpolicies seeking to strengthen cybersecurity
practices. However, recent events indicate that these policies are less
than ideal. This Note suggests that a unified response to cybersecurity
is required and calls for the establishment of a single, central federal
agency with authority over all cybersecurity regulations. Such an
agency would promulgate adequate and appropriateregulations to best
protect sensitive data.
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On July 29, 2017, consumer credit reporter Equifax discovered
it had been hacked by cybercriminals who obtained Social Security
numbers, addresses, birth dates, and some credit card information of
around 143 million Americans-nearly half the population of the
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United States.' When Equifax announced the hack on September 7,
2017,2 Americans were understandably angry-their most sensitive
financial data was exposed and could potentially cause harm for years
to come.3 Though still incomplete, both internal investigations and US
government probes have uncovered evidence that suggests the breach
was conducted by foreign state-sponsored hackers. 4
If the Equifax hack was indeed state sponsored, Equifax will not
have been the first company targeted. Former FBI Director James
Comey showcased the prolific nature of state-sponsored attacks, stating
that "[t]here are two kinds of big companies in the United States[,] . .
those who've been hacked by the Chinese and those who don't know
they've been hacked by the Chinese."5 State actors 6 -including the
United States7 -have increasingly been behind major cyber-breaches,
corporate or otherwise. 8 For example, in May 2017, a strain of
ransomware dubbed "WannaCry" infected tens of thousands of entities
across 150 countries. 9
Afflicted entities included healthcare
-

1.
See Craig Timberg et al., Data of 143 Million Americans - Nearly Half the Country
Exposed
in
Equifax
Hack,
CHI.
TRIB.
(Sept.
8,
2017),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/national/ct-equifax-data-breach-20170907-story.html
[https://perma.cc/35ZU-33X2]; U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/popclock/ [https://perma.cc/876P-7PZ5?type-image] (last visited Oct. 4,
2018) (projecting the US resident population to be 328,732,057).
2.
Equifax Announces Cybersecurity Incident Involving Consumer Information, EQUIFAX
(Sept. 7, 2017), https://investor.equifax.comnews-and-events/news/2017/09-07-2017-213000628
[https://perma.cc/R32N-XG55].
3.
See Ben Popken, Equifax Fallout:FTC Launches Probe, Websites, and Phones Jammed
with
Angry
Consumers,
NBC
News
(Sept.
13,
2017,
2:39
PM),
https://www.nbenews.com/business/consumer/equifax-melts-down-under-surge-angry-consumers-

n800991 [https://perma.ccIW7KP-LK5P]; Michael Riley et al., The Equifax Hack Has the
Hallmarks of State-Sponsored Pros, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(Sept. 29, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.comlnews/features/2017-09-29/the-equifax-hack-has-all-the-hallmarks-ofstate-sponsored-pros [https://perma.cc/9KCP-GEAK;.
4.
See Riley et al., supra note 3.
5.
See James Cook, FBI Director: China Has Hacked Every Big US Company, BUS.
INSIDER (Oct. 6, 2014, 6:24 AM), http://www.businessinsider.comlfbi-director-china-has-hackedevery-big-us-company-2014-10 [https://perma.cc/QP4K-9SAN]; accord Scott Pelley, FBI Director
on
Threat of ISIS,
Cybercrime, CBS
NEWS:
60
MINUTES
(Oct.
5,
2014),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/fbi-director-james-comey-on-threat-of-isis-cybercrime/
[https://perma.cc/H3NS-HJN4].
6.
For the purposes of this Note, the term "state actors" is defined to mean national
governments, their agencies, or individuals acting on behalf of a government.
7.
See Barton Gellman & Ellen Nakashima, U.S. Spy Agencies Mounted 231 Offensive
Cyber-Operations in
2011, Documents Show,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
30,
2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-spy-agencies-mounted-231offensive-cyber-operations-in-201 1-documents-show/20 13/08/30/d09Oa6ae- 1 19e- 11e3-b4cbfd7ce041d814 story.html?utm-term=.e538bcbf8a74 [https://perma.cclDCG8-BG28].
8.
See Chris Colvin et al., Cyber Warfareand the CorporateEnvironment, 2 J.L. & CYBER
WARFARE 1, 3-4 (2013).
9.
See Ellen Nakashima, The NSA Has Linked the WannaCry Computer Worm to North
Korea, WASH. POST (June 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/thensa-has-linked-the-wannacry-computer-worm-to-north-korea/2017/06/14/101395a2-508e- 1 1e7-
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institutions, public utilities, and large corporations.1 0 The virus worked
by locking users out of infected systems, then ransoming off the key to
Following investigations, the National Security
regain control."
Agency (NSA) linked the creation of WannaCry to the North Korean
government, claiming the ransomware was an attempt to raise revenue
for the regime. 12
As the proliferation of the internet connects more of the world,
state-sponsored cyberattacks are on the risel 3-a trend experts predict
will not change.1 4 Despite the increased incidence of state-sponsored
cybercrime, the US government's response has been underwhelming.
State legislatures have enacted laws enforcing cybersecurity measures;
however, their efforts are not coordinated with other states, creating
laws that lack parity with one another. 15 The federal response suffered
the same issues due to various administrative agencies promulgating a
and often conflicting
patchwork of "sometimes redundant
6
to cyberattacks has
response
government
lackluster
The
regulations."1
left cyber defense largely to the private sector, and the lack of a unified
legal framework signals to the private sector a sense of regulatory
ambivalence on the issue. Further, the lack of a unified framework
unnecessarily increases difficulty and cost to comply with cybersecurity
regulations, which could potentially cause some companies to cut
corners on their security compliance.
Although legal frameworks are a necessary part of protecting
The
sensitive data from cybercrimes, this alone is not enough.

be25-3a519335381c story.html?utmterm=.764a4a7ef88c

[https://perma.cc/S3Ww-VBZZ];

Lily

Hay Newman, The Ransomware Meltdown Experts Warned About is Here, WIRED (May 12, 2017,
https://www.wired.com/2017/05/ransomware-meltdown-experts-warned/
PM),
2:03

[https://perma.cc[UV29-FN42].
See Lily Hay Newman, The Biggest Cybersecurity Disasters of 2017 So Far, WIRED
10.
https://www.wired.com/story/2017-biggest-hacks-so-farl
AM),
10:00
2017,
1,
(July
[https://perma.cc[UV29-FN42].
See Newman, supra note 9.
11.
See Nakashima, supra note 9.
12.
See Mark Testoni, License to Hack: State-Sponsored Hackers Are Upping the Ante,
13.
HILL (Mar. 6, 2018, 9:00 AM), http://thehill.com/opinion/cybersecurity/376807-license-to-hackstate-sponsored-hackers-are-upping-the-ante [https://perma.cc/6RCF-7Q69].
See Warwick Ashford, Infosec Pros Expect Increase in Nation State Cyber Attacks,
14.
PM),
2:57
2018,
21,
(June
WKLY.
COMPUTER
https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252443475/Infosec-pros-expect-increase-in-nation-statecyber-attacks [https://perma.cclWB4Y-LZZR].
See David Forscey et al., Cybersecurity is the Next Frontier of State Regulation,
15.
LAW360 (May 11, 2017, 1:26 PM), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/922786/cybersecurity-is-thenext-frontier-of-state-regulation [https://perma.cclDS99-KEU3].
Jessie Bur, Federal Cybersecurity Regulations Called Inconsistent, Redundant,
16.
McCaskill),
Claire
Senator
(quoting
PM)
2:11
2017,
23,
(June
MERITALK
https://www.meritalk.com/articles/federal-cybersecurity-regulations-called-inconsistent-

redundant-senatel [https://perma.cc/VNL3-4Y65]; accord Forscey et al., supra note 15.
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increasing complexity and frequency of foreign state-sponsored data
breaches suggests that corporations alone are not doing enough to
protect data from malicious actions by state actors, especially when
companies could have prevented the two attacks described above by
simply applying software patches when they became available." This
Note argues that nuanced federal regulation promulgated via a single
administrative agency is required to best guarantee the safety of
sensitive consumer data. Part I discusses the motives behind statesponsored hacking, its potential impact on citizens, and current
regulations.
Part II examines strategy suggestions posed by the
existing literature and politicians. Part III argues why the creation of
an administrative agency, which can regulate and monitor corporate
cybersecurity provides the best protection for citizens, corporations, and
the US economy. Part IV offers concluding remarks, reiterating that a
central
administrative agency could improve protections for
corporations and their customers.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Foreign State Motives to Hack Businesses
Perhaps the most obvious motivation of a state-sponsored
cyberattack is economic gain. As previously discussed, the NSA
believes North Korea launched WannaCry to directly fund their
Reconnaissance General Bureau, the agency that conducts North
Korea's cyber operations.1 8 North Korea has also been linked to various
cyber heists throughout Asia, including an $81 million heist from a
Bangladeshi bank, achieved by altering the bank's online payment
messaging system.1 9
Hard currency is not the only economic benefit to be obtained
from cyber activities. China, for example, has expended significant
efforts to obtain an enormous amount of intellectual property from US
17.
See Matt Burgess, Everything You Need to Know About EternalBlue- the NSA Exploit
Linked to Petya, WIRED (June 28, 2017), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/what-is-eternal-blueexploit-vulnerability-patch [https://perma.ccV8AE-RZ8E]; Lily Hay Newman, Equifax Officially
Has No Excuse, WIRED (Sept. 14, 2017, 1:27 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/equifax-breach-noexcuse/ [https://perma.cc/5X2P-GUXP]. Equifax was initially hacked in May via a vulnerability in
a web-application software that a software developer identified and patched in March. See
Newman, supra. Equifax had over two months to fix the vulnerability but failed to do so. See id.
Similarly, the WannaCry ransomware relied on exploiting a known Microsoft Operating System
vulnerability named "EternalBlue," which was patched in a "critical" security update released on
March 14, before WannaCry started to spread. See Burgess, supra.
18.
See Nakashima, supranote 9 ("WannaCry was apparently an attempt to raise revenue
for the regime .... [Tihough the hackers raised $140,000 in bitcoin . .. so far they have not cashed
it in .... ").
19.
See id.
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Through intellectual property theft, the Chinese
businesses. 20
government is able to give its economy a competitive advantage by
distributing US firms' research to Chinese businesses. 2 1 In an
interview with NPR, James Lewis of the Center for Strategic and
International Studies reported that "[y]ou can see the immediate
economic benefit: You don't have to pay for the design, you can build it
cheaper, and you can offer the same product at a lower price." 2 2 Indeed,
the US Trade Representative estimates that "Chinese theft of American
IP currently costs between $225 billion and $600 billion annually." 23
The United States responded to China's unlawful cyber activity
by publicly shaming the Chinese government and, in 2014, criminally
indicting Chinese citizens for hacking US businesses. 24 Though the
United States charged five Chinese military hackers with thirty-one
counts each-including conspiring to commit computer fraud, computer
hacking, economic espionage, and other offenseS 25-the move was
"almost certainly symbolic since there is virtually no chance that the
Chinese would turn over the five People's Liberation Army members
named in the indictment." 26 The United States' use of public shaming
and symbolic indictments is a testament to both the importance the

20.
See China's Cyber Threat a High-Stakes Spy Game, NPR (Nov. 27, 2011, 6:03 PM),
http://www.npr.org/20 11/11/27/142828055/chinas-cyber-threat-a-high-stakes-spy-game?sc=tw
[https://perma.cclR7RJ-FHGS].
21.
See id.
Id.
22.
Scott J. Shackelford, On Climate Change and Cyber Attacks: Leveraging Polycentric
23.
Governance to Mitigate Global Collective Action Problems, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 653, 655
(2016) ("[E]stimates on the [global] cost of cyber attacks range from approximately $400 billion in
2014 to more than $3 trillion by 2020."); Sherisse Pham, How Much Has the US Lost from China's
IP Theft?, CNN (Mar. 23, 2018, 5:35 AM) (quoting the US Trade Representative),
http://money.cnn.com/2018/03/23/technology/china-us-trump-tariffs-ip-theft/index.html
[https://perma.cc/8TAQ-GFMH].
See U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for Espionage Against U.S.
24.
Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial Advantage, U.S. DEP'T JUST. (May 19,
2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-cyber-espionageagainst-us-corporations-and-labor [https://perma.cc/X6DK-E4GH]; China's Cyber Threat a HighStakes Spy Game, supra note 20.
See Indictment at 1-2, United States v. Wang Dong, No. 14-118 (W.D. Pa. May 1,
25.
46
1949.pdf
2014), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/5122014519132358
to
and including at least in or
up
2006
in
or
about
[https://perma.cc/4UT3-CSL4] ("From at least
about April 2014, members of the People's Liberation Army ('PLA'), the military of the People's
Republic of China ('China'), conspired together and with each other to hack into the computers of
commercial entities located in the Western District of Pennsylvania and elsewhere in the United
States, to maintain unauthorized access to those computers, and to steal information from those
entities that would be useful to their competitors in China, including state-owned enterprises
('SOEs')."); U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for Espionage Against U.S. Corporations
and a Labor Organizationfor CommercialAdvantage, supra note 24.
Michael S. Schmidt & David E. Sanger, 5 in China Army Face U.S. Charges of
26.
Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/20/us/us-to-chargechinese-workers-with-cyberspying.html [https://perma.cc/UT6T-5SAW].
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government places on protecting its citizens from cybercrime and the
difficulty of the task.
Foreign states may also be motivated to target businesses in
order to conduct acts of terrorism or aggression. Due to increasing
network interconnectivity, state-sponsored hackers and non-stateaffiliated
groups
have
committed
cyberattacks
of critical
infrastructure-such
as US financial institutions-as acts of
"Postmodern Terrorism." 2 7 John Michael McConnell, former Director
of National Intelligence, posited that "a successful attack on a large
American financial institution 'would have an order-of-magnitude
greater impact on the global economy than the Sept. 11, 2001,
attacks."'28
Other nations have clearly recognized the potential damage of
cyberattacks. 2 9 Colonels of the Chinese People's Liberation Army
included strategies for conducting cyberattacks against US financial
institutions in a book about war tactics. 30 Additionally, in 2010, a
hacker in Russia, who may or may not have been related to the Russian
government, 3 1 breached the Nasdaq Stock Market and implanted
malware designed to spy, steal data, and, if activated, cause "digital
destruction." 32 Fortunately, the implanted malware never fulfilled its

27.

Colvin et al., supra note 8, at 3. As an extreme example, Estonia's government was

nearly crippled by cyberattacks traced to Russian officials working for Vladimir Putin after
Estonia removed a World War II-era Soviet soldier statue from a park. See Mark Landler & John
Markoff, Digital Fears Emerge After Data Siege in Estonia, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/technology/29estonia.html
[https://perma.cclV8KF-PFBD].
The attacks were particularly debilitating due to the high reliance Estonian citizens placed on the
internet; vital government functions such as voting or paying taxes were impossible. See id. The
Estonian defense minister compared the attacks to the country's "ports [being] shut to the sea."
Id.
28.
Tom C.W. Lin, Financial Weapons of War, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1377, 1388 (2016)
(quoting John Michael McConnell).
29.
See id. at 1396-97.
30.
See id. at 1391 (citing QIAO LIANG & WANG XIANGSUI, UNRESTRICTED WARFARE:
CHINA'S MASTER PLAN To DESTROY AMERICA 120-23 (2002)).

31.
Compare Stephanie Yang & Elena Holodny, The Massive Hack of the Nasdaq That
Has Wall Street Terrified of Cyber Attacks, BUS. INSIDER (July 17, 2014, 3:37 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/nasdaq-attacked-by-hackers-2014-7
[https://perma.cc/XS4QFK8R] ("By 2011, [the officials] had concluded that Russia wanted to imitate the Nasdaq exchange,
and used the hack to collect information for their own stock exchanges."), with Jose Pagliery,
Russian Hackers Placed 'Digital Bomb' in Nasdaq - Report, CNN (July 17, 2014, 3: 49 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2014/07/17/technology/security/nasdaq-hack/index.html
[https://perma.cclH4N2-2JQC] ("[Tihose familiar with the investigation say the more likely
attacker is an independent Russian hacker from the city of St. Petersburg named Aleksandr
Kalinin.").
32.
Pagliery, supra note 31; accord Yang & Holodny, supra note 31.
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destructive purpose, 33 but the fear of another Nasdaq breach lingers
today. 34
Russia is not the only foreign nation to target the US financial
sector. In 2012, Iran carried out a cyberattack that resulted in major
service disruptions to the online banking sites of many of the United
States' largest banks.35 Rather than attempt to steal money from the
36
banks, the Iranian hackers employed use of a "botnet" to conduct a
37
(DDoS) attack on the banks in
Distributed Denial of Service
sanctions and the United States'
economic
Western
retaliation for
38
involvement with a virus used to destroy Iranian Nuclear centrifuges.
Causing disruption or destruction when hacking financial institutions
39
in lieu of stealing money is a hallmark of state-sponsored cybercrime.

See Pagliery, supra note 31.
33.
See Cameron Colquhoun, Was the Nasdaq 'Glitch' Really Stock Market Warfare?,
34.
WIRED (July 21, 2017), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/nasdaq-hack-july [https://perma.cc/3XT6PSRJ] ("[A]s New York's financial community left their offices and headed for the beaches of the
Hamptons or the cooler forests of Upstate, shock waves rippled through the markets. Just before
12.30 p.m. local time, the world's biggest stock exchange, Nasdaq, was displaying the stock prices
of Amazon, Microsoft, Apple, and more than a dozen other companies at same price; $123.47....
The cause? Nasdaq claimed that 'erroneous third party test data' was behind the wild swings in
stock prices. Whilst we should take Nasdaq at its word-that this was a simple error-it is vital to
remember that Nasdaq had no other choice. Communicating any kind of hack or security breach
would trigger a major market incident and, potentially, a financial crash similar to that of 2008.
It is, nevertheless, incumbent to consider the alternatives, and explore the possibility that the 3
July resetting of share prices was a deliberate act.").
35.
See Nicole Perlroth & Quentin Hardy, Bank Hacking Was the Work of Iranians,
Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/09/technology/onlinebanking-attacks-were-work-of-iran-us-officials-say.html [https://perma.cc/5SZ8-6YST].
See Perlroth & Hardy, supra note 35. A botnet is a network of computers infected by
36.
"bots," or "web robots," which stealthily take control of infected machines. See What is a Botnet?,
NORTON, https://us.norton.com/botnet/ [https://perma.cc/4vWW-H6P9] (last visited Sept. 22,
2018). The network can contain up to hundreds of thousands of machines, most infected without
their owner's knowledge. See id. With the network at their disposal, the bot's master can use vast,
global computing power to conduct various cybercriminal activities. See id.
Perlroth & Hardy, supra note 35; see also Swathi Padmanabhan, Note, Hacking for
37.
Lulz: Employing Expert Hackers to Combat Cyber Terrorism, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 191,
197-98 (2012) (explaining the mechanics of a DDoS attack); Understanding Denial-of-Service
Attacks,

U.S.

COMPUTER

EMERGENCY

READINESS

TEAM

(Feb.

6,

2013),

https://web.archive.org/web/20180117112517/https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/STO4-015
[https://perma.ccLW4G-VKXC] ("In a denial-of-service (DoS) attack, an attacker attempts to
prevent legitimate users from accessing information or services. . . . The most common and obvious

type of DoS attack occurs when an attacker 'floods' a network with information. When you type a
URL for a particular website into your browser, you are sending a request to that site's computer
server to view the page. The server can only process a certain number of requests at once, so if an

attacker overloads the server with requests, it can't process your request.... In a distributed
denial-of-service (DDoS) attack, an attacker may use your computer to attack another computer.

By taking advantage of security vulnerabilities or weaknesses, an attacker could take control of
your computer. He or she could then force your computer to send huge amounts of data to a website

or send spam to particular email addresses.").
See Perlroth & Hardy, supranote 35.
38.
39.
See id.
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The final motive considered behind foreign state hacking is to
make a statement for political gain. A particularly salient example is
the alleged Russian interference with the 2016 US presidential
campaign.
Here, Russian hackers targeted the Department of
Homeland Security's election infrastructure before the November
election, among other activities. 40 Though this Note does not posit the
exact motives behind Russia's activities, its actions neither sought to
destroy infrastructure nor achieve financial gain. 4 1
A similar motive is evident in North Korea's 2014 hack of Sony
Pictures Entertainment in response to the production of The
Interview-a film in which James Franco and Seth Rogan play
characters who attempt to assassinate a highly parodied Kim Jong
Un. 4 2
In response, a North Korean-backed group, which called
themselves "the Guardians of Peace," stole and leaked unreleased
movies, personal employee information, and emails. 43 Moreover, the
group threatened "9/11-type attacks on theaters that screen The
Interview" and consequently disrupted the film's release through its
threats. 4 4 The frequency and ease with which nations are utilizing
cybercrime as a relatively effective means of international political
expression suggests that those nations are unlikely to stop hacking any
time soon.
B. Why ProtectionsAre Vital

-

There are two primary arguments for why preventing cyber
breaches against private-sector networks is vital: national security and
consumer protection. First, businesses must shield themselves from
hackers to ensure the physical and economic safety of the nation and its
citizens. Nuclear power plants-which have already been targeted 45
are a prime example of a private network that must be defended due to
the physical devastation that could result from sabotage or other
40.
See 2016 PresidentialCampaign Hacking Fast Facts, CNN (July 18, 2018, 11:43 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/26/us/2016-presidential-campaign-hacking-fast-facts/index.html
[https://perma.cc/B82Y-V4WT].
41.
See id. ("while the CIA assessment shows that the Russians may have sought to
damage Clinton and help Trump, the FBI has yet to find proof that the attacks were orchestrated
to elect the Republican candidate .... ).
42.
See Lori Grisham, Timeline: North Korea and the Sony Pictures Hack, USA TODAY
(Jan. 5, 2015, 12:36 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/12/18/sony-hacktimeline-interview-north-korea/20601645/ [https://perma.cc/VTP9-AJBV].
43.
See id.
44.
Id.
45.
See Nicole Periroth, Hackers Are Targeting Nuclear Facilities, Homeland Security
Dept.
and
F.B.I.
Say,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
6,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/06/technology/nuclear-plant-hack-report.html
[https://perma.cc/S4YQ-FC5V].
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cyberattacks. For example, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians have
twice lost power when Russian-backed hackers shut down their
electrical grid. 46 In 2017, hackers with suspected Russian affiliations
gained direct access to US power grid controls. 47 The hackers did not
cut power to US citizens, but they could have.4 8 The financial
institutions discussed above are a less obvious but equally important
example of a vulnerable network. If targeted, cyber attackers have the
capacity to cripple the domestic and global economy. 49 As such, some
scholars argue that "[flinance may be the most powerful weapon of
war." 0
Due to the size, interconnectivity, and speed that transactions
are conducted, modern financial institutions represent critical points to
protect.5 1 Should a foreign state cause one or multiple of those
institutions to collapse, the financial harm to the United States could
be more ruinous than the harms caused by the Great Recession. 52 The
increased interconnectivity of other financial institutions, like venture
capital firms, might create institutions which are "too linked to fail," in
that the institutions are related to so many others that the failure of
one could ripple across the system regardless of size. 53 Finally,
transactions in the modern financial infrastructure occur in
milliseconds, creating risks that failures in financial institutions might
produce repercussions which are "too fast to save." 54 "Flash crashes"
exemplify the concept of "too fast to save,"55 the largest of which
46.

See Andy Greenberg, How an Entire Nation Became Russia's Test Lab for Cyberwar,

WIRED (June 20, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/russian-hackers-attack-ukraine/
[https://perma.cc/J5L7-C6V8].
47.
See Andy Greenberg, Hackers GainDirect Access to US Power Grid Controls, WIRED
(Sept. 6, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/hackers-gain-switch-flipping-access-to-uspower-systems/ [https://perma.ccWB9H-4GBIJ.

See id. Experts believe that the hackers did not cut power to US consumers because
48.
they wanted to wait for a strategically opportune time to do so, such as in response to an armed
conflict or as part of a threat to deter the United States from hacking into other countries' critical
infrastructure. See, e.g., id.
See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
49.

See, e.g., Lin, supra note 28, at 1377.
50.
See id. at 1388 ("The modern financial infrastructure is subject to critical systemic
51.
risks and vulnerabilities due to its size, links, and speed.").
See id. at 1389.
52.
53.
Id. at 1389-90; see also id. at 1390 ("For instance, in 1998, the Federal Reserve
initiated a $3.6 billion private bailout for Long-Term Capital Management, a hedge fund with
fewer than two hundred employees, because its demise would have generated significant losses for
many investment banks and caused widespread panic in the international financial markets. Since

then, hedge funds and other financial intermediaries have only grown larger in size, volume, and
importance, further exacerbating the risks of 'too linked to fail."').
Id. at 1391-92.
54.
See id.; Kimberly Amadeo, Flash Crash Explained with Examples: Recent Examples
55.
and What Caused Them, BALANCE (Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-a-flashcrash-3306184 [https://perma.cc/V4TJ-FKF6]. A "flash crash" occurs when "a market ... plummets

318

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 21:1:309

occurred May 6, 2010.56 During the May 6th crash, the Dow Jones
briefly lost a trillion dollars of market value in under an hour.57 The
market recovered shortly thereafter,58 but the crash and others like it
serve as a warning for the speed at which the financial sector might
experience harms.
Second, it is vital to protect businesses from cyberattacks to
safeguard consumer data.
Financial harms to consumers from
corporate hacks can be devastating partly because many large
companies hold treasure troves of financial information. As of this
writing, one woman has already had her identity stolen fifteen times as
a result of the Equifax breach. 59 If a consumer's personal and financial
information is compromised by a foreign state trying to generate
revenue for its cyber activities, US consumers would bear the financial
burden.6 0
Hacks can also violate consumer privacy as easily as they violate
a consumer's bank account. Although some businesses allow consumers
to volunteer the sensitive personal data they gather, like dating
websites or social media, 61 some large businesses unilaterally obtain
sensitive consumer data and profit by selling that data to companies. 62
Even when businesses only obtain consumer-volunteered data,
consumers are so accustomed to providing their data to obtain products

within minutes, then rebounds. Different things can set it off, but computer trading programs
make any crash worse." Id.

56.
See Ben Rooney, Trading ProgramSparked May 'Flash Crash', CNN MONEY (Oct. 1,
2010, 2:56 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/10/01/markets/SECCFTC-flashcrash/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/9MHG-YHSH]; Jill Treanor, The 2010 'FlashCrash'-How it Unfolded, GUARDIAN
(Apr. 22, 2015, 1:43 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/apr/22/2010-flash-crashnew-york-stock-exchange-unfolded [https://perma.ccfMFD9-NHLH].
57.
See Rooney, supra note 56; Treanor, supra note 56.
58.
See Treanor, supra note 56.
59.
See Woman's ID Stolen 15 Times After Equifax Breach, CNN (Oct. 29, 2017, 12:24 AM),
https://web.archive.org/web/20171029110447/http://www.wafb.com/story/36709925/
womans-id-stolen-15-times-after-equifax-breach [https://perma.cclM7FR-7T27].
60.
Such information could either be sold to a criminal or held for ransom back to the
original owner, such as in WannaCry. See supra notes 9, 11 and accompanying text.
61.
See Michael Zimmer, OkCupid Study Reveals the Perils of Big-Data Science, WIRED
(May 14, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/05/okcupid-study-reveals-perils-big-datascience/ [https://perma.cc/2R27-SCRQ].
62.
See Brian Naylor, Firms Are Buying, Sharing Your Online Info. What Can You Do
About
It?,
NPR
(July
11,
2016,
4:51
PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/07/11/485571291/firms-are-buying-sharingyour-online-info-what-can-you-do-about-it [https://perma.cc/J3LE-66KK] ("They're called data
brokers, and they collect all sorts of information - names, addresses, income, where you go on the
Internet and who you connect with online. That information is then sold to other companies. There
are few regulations governing these brokers. Some of the categories are innocuous - pet owner,
or winter sports enthusiast. But . . . others were more problematic, like 'single mom struggling in
an urban setting' or 'people who did not speak English and felt more comfortable speaking in
Spanish' or 'gamblers."').
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or services that many do so willingly. 63 This is especially true with
brands consumers trust. 64 As previous Ashley Madison users are
aware, stolen social data can be as harmful as stolen financial data. 65
Exposed consumer data, whether financial or otherwise, harms
individuals due to a corporation's failure to keep their data safecreating a powerful incentive to ensure corporations employ the highest
practicable standard of cybersecurity.
C. Review of CurrentRegulations
The federal government has issued several statutes that
criminalize behaviors generally associated with cybercrime 66 but has
passed nothing by way of overarching private sector cybersecurity
regulation. 67 Various pieces of legislation, which may create or unify
security standards, have been introduced in Congress but none have
become law. 6 8 Congress is likely unable or unwilling to pass sweeping
63.

See Steve Olenski, For Consumers, Data Is a Matter of Trust, FORBES (Apr. 18, 2016,

9:35 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/steveolenskil2016/04/18/for-consumers-data-is-a-matter-

of-trust/ [https://perma.cc/P5GS-ACRF].
64.
See id. ("Although the consumers who participated clearly understood which data was
the most sensitive, including address, mobile phone number, name and date of birth, they were
still willing (75%) to share it with companies in exchange for a product or service they value and
a brand they trust. Even more consumers (80%) were positively influenced into sharing personal

&

data with companies when they received special offers or data-enabled benefits.").
65.
See Jose Pagliery, Now You Can Search the Ashley Madison Cheaters List, CNN (Aug.
PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2015/08/19/technology/ashley-madison1:06
19,
2015,
searchlindex.html [https://perma.cc/V69Q-DHA7] ("The stolen database of 32 million people who
used cheating website Ashley Madison has made its way to the Web. And it's easily searchable on
several websites.... Many of the cheaters exposed in this hack serve in the U.S. military, evident
because they used email addresses that end in the .mil domain. Adultery does, in fact, violate
Uniform Code of Military Justice. It's a prosecutable offense that can land you a year in
confinement and a dishonorable discharge. What about people who used Ashley Madison to engage
in gay affairs? The website's users were worldwide, and there are 79 countries where
homosexuality is illegal. In Afghanistan, Iran, Mauritania, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates, the punishment is death.").
See Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, Pub. L. No. 105-318, 112 Stat.
66.
3007 (1998) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1029); Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Pub. L.
No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030); Wiretap Act, Pub. L.
No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2511; Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 2701); Stephanie Balitzer, Note, What Common Law and Common Sense Teach Us
About Corporate Cybersecurity, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 891, 901-04 (2016).
See Michael Hooker & Jason Pill, You've Been Hacked and Now You're Being Sued:
67.
The Developing World of Cybersecurity Litigation, 90 FLA. B.J. 31, 37 (2016) ("A few of these
regulatory initiatives have encountered stiff resistance due, in part, to the absence of any
overarching federal legislation to regulate cyber-security liability and the lack of a uniform
standard for private-sector cybersecurity programs."); Evan M. Wooten, The State ofData-Breach
Litigation and Enforcement: Before the 2013 Mega Breaches and Beyond, 24 J. ANTITRUST
UNFAIR COMPETITION L. SEC. ST. B. CAL. 229, 239 (2015) ("Congress has yet to address data
security in the private sector or to set (or authorize) mandatory standards .....
68.
See Hooker & Pill, supra note 67, at 40 n.53.
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legislation because a one-size-fits-all approach to cybersecurity would
be impractical and incapable of adjusting to increasingly sophisticated
attacks.6 9
Federal agencies have implemented scattered regulations, all of
For example, the
which possess unmistakable drawbacks.
70
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act authorizes the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) to develop data security standards.
However, adherence to those standards is entirely voluntary for
Similarly, the Department of
members of the private sector.7 '
Homeland Security has implemented an information-sharing program
pursuant to the Cybersecurity Act of 2015.72 This program is also
voluntary, was slow to initiate, and has garnered few participants. 73
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has enacted seemingly
mandatory standards, but they are loosely defined. 74 Nevertheless, the
FTC has successfully settled with over fifty companies for having
"unfair data security practices" and required them to (1) create a
comprehensive security program designed to address security risks
related to developing and managing services for consumers and (2)
protect the security and confidentiality of consumer information.7 5
While the FTC's authority related to unfair practices expands to almost

69.
See James Eastman, Note, Avoiding Cyber-Pearl Harbor: Evaluating Government
Efforts to EncouragePrivate Sector CriticalInfrastructureCybersecurity Improvements, 18 COLUM.

SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 515, 545 (2017).
70.
See Cybersecurity Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 113-274, § 201, 128 Stat. 2971, 2974
(2014) (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. § 7431 (2012)).
71.
See Wooten, supra note 67, at 239 ("The new data-security bills only affect federal
agencies and any critical infrastructure standards promulgated by NIST will be voluntary.").
72.
See Cybersecurity Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. N, 129 Stat. 2242, 2936-80
(2015) (codified as amended 6 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1532 (2017)); U.S. DEP'T. OF HOMELAND SEC.,
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE THREAT INFORMATION SHARING FRAMEWORK: A REFERENCE GUIDE FOR
THE
CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
COMMUNITY
1
(2016),

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ci-threat-information-sharing-framework508.pdf [https://perma.cc/NU43-AYXS]; Cyber Information Sharing and CollaborationProgram
(CISCP), U.S. DEP'T HOMELAND SECURITY (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/ciscp
[https://perma.ce/N6Q9-U8QW].
73.
See Eastman, supra note 69, at 546, 549.
74.
See Andrea Arias, The NIST Cybersecurity Framework and the FTC, FED. TRADE
COMMISSION (Aug. 31, 2016, 2:34 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/businessblog/2016/08/nist-cybersecurity-framework-ftc [https://perma.cclW62J-229F]. The FTC suggests
that complying with the NIST Cybersecurity framework is consistent with the FTC's process-based
approach the FTC employs to determine whether a firm has met their minimal security
requirements but maintains that the true is that of "reasonableness." Id. ("[T]he touchstone of the
FTC's approach to data security has been reasonableness ... in light of the volume and sensitivity
of information the company holds, the size and complexity of the company's operations, the cost of
the tools that are available to address vulnerabilities, and other factors.").
75.
See Eastman, supra note 69, at 535, 537.
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any industry,7 6 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) prohibits the FTC from prosecuting
unless the security measures are "likely to cause substantial injury to
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves
and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to
The US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
competition." 7
recently questioned the FTC's expansive interpretation of § 45(n),
suggesting the agency's oversight may be further curtailed in the
future.7 8 It is unsurprising that the FTC faces increased difficulties
promulgating regulations relative to other administrative agencies,
given the FTC's history of being disciplined for agency overreach.79
While Congress has failed to pass legislation regarding
cybersecurity standards, states are enacting their own.80 The statutes
generally focus exclusively on consumer data security and utilize some
type of reasonableness standard.8 1 The statutes vary, however, in both
the type of data requiring protections and what qualifies as a
''reasonable" level of protection-thereby creating a patchwork of
incongruous regulations, which may prove too burdensome for some
businesses to navigate.8 2 Most of the statutes also fail to address
operational security procedures, 83 an unfortunate oversight when "over
95 percent of all incidents investigated [by IBM's Managed Security
Services] recognize 'human error' as a contributing factor." 84

II. ANALYSIS
Recent breaches have proven that consumer data is vulnerable
In a landscape featuring few
and privacy concerns are valid. 85
76.

See 15 U.S.C.

§ 45(a)(2)

(2018) ("The Commission is hereby empowered and directed

to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of competition in

or affecting
77.
78.
79.

commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.").
15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
See LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 678 F. App'x 816, 820-21 (11th Cir. 2016).
See J. Howard Beales, The FTC's Use of Unfairness Authority: Its Rise, Fall, and

https://www.ftc.gov/public2003),
(May
30,
COMMISSION
TRADE
Resurrection, FED.
statements/2003/05/ftes-use-unfairness- authority-its-rise-fall-and-resurrection

[https://perma.cclLT98-6ZFA]. After a striking example of agency overreach, Congress shut down
the FTC for several days and introduced legislation limiting the FTC's ability to promulgate
unfairness rulemakings. See id.
See Forscey et al., supra note 15.
80.
81.
See id.
82.
See id.
See id. Operational cybersecurity consists of actions of people, purposeful or mistaken;
83.
systems and technology failures; failed internal processes; and external events, such as natural
disasters, legal issues, or service provider dependencies. See JAMES J. CEBULA & LISA R. YOUNG,
SOFTWARE ENG'G INST., A TAXONOMY OF OPERATIONAL CYBER SECURITY RISKS 2 (2010).
IBM GLOB. TECH. SERVS., IBM SECURITY SERVICES 2014 CYBER SECURITY
84.
INTELLIGENCE INDEX 1, 3 (2014) [hereinafter IBM REPORT].

85.

See supra Section I.B.
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comprehensive regulationS 86 and hitherto inefficient consumer
protections, one question remains: What, if anything, should be done to
improve consumer safety regarding cybersecurity vulnerabilities? This
Part provides an analysis of three potential solutions. Section A
discusses an elective partnership between the private sector and the
federal government. Section B considers the military assuming total
responsibility and control of private sector cybersecurity. Section C
analyzes a system in which the federal government mandates rigorous
minimum cybersecurity standards for the private sector.
A. Public-PrivateCybersecurity
The first possible solution is to leave the responsibility to protect
consumer data in the hands of the private sector, who would be
motivated by economic pressures or government encouragement.
"Public-private cybersecurity" is the de facto system of cyber defense,
which is "characterized by the surprisingly important, quasigovernmental role of the private sector on many important
cybersecurity issues, and correspondingly, by instances in which the
federal government acts more like a market participant than a
traditional regulator." 7 The theory is wildly popular with government
officials, 8 8 private sector representatives, and the media. 89 In fact, the
strategy even received endorsement by President Obama during his
remarks at the National Cybersecurity Communications Integration
Center. 90
The partnership has been one of convenience for the government
for two key reasons. First, cooperation with private firms makes sense
for the government because the United States' critical national cyber
infrastructure is owned, operated, and protected by the private sector.9 1
86.
See supra Section I.C.
87.
Kristen E. Eichensehr, Public-Private Cybersecurity, 95 TEX. L. REV. 467, 470-71
(2017).
88.
See id. at 469-70. Navy Adm. Mike Rogers, director of the NSA and the commander
of the US Cyber Command, stated it was unrealistic for either the private sector or the government
alone to withstand against cyberattacks; cooperation is needed. See Cheryl Pellerin, Cybercom
Commander: Public-Private PartnershipsNeeded for Cybersecurity, U.S. DEP'T DEF. (Nov. 16,
2016),
https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1006807/cybercom-commander-publicprivate-partnerships-needed-for-cybersecurity/ [https://perma.ccfLGU2-EAMS].
89.
Eichensehr, supra note 87, at 469-70.
90.
See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National
Cybersecurity Communications Integration Center (Jan. 13, 2015) ("Most of [our critical]
infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector. So neither government, nor the private
sector can defend the nation alone. It's going to have to be a shared mission-government and
industry working hand in hand, as partners.").
91.
See Justin S. Daniels & Joe D. Whitley, Cybersecurity Public Private Partnerships:
Challenges and Opportunities, L.J. NEWSL. (Feb. 2017), http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/
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Receiving cooperation from targeted firms is vital because the
government needs full access to a firm's network and data to investigate
attacks and strengthen defenses. 92 Cooperation and information
sharing is important because it is both prohibitively expensive and
currently against the law for the NSA to monitor privately owned
critical infrastructure.9 3 With appropriate private participation, the
government need not spend the resources or create new laws to monitor
critical infrastructure.
The second point of convenience for the government is that the
private sector is able to perform tasks that would be difficult-either
structurally or politically-for the government to perform itself. For
example, in recent years, the private sector has been quick to publicly
attribute cyber intrusions to state-sponsored actors-often based on
data provided to the firm by the US government 94-when the US
government would have otherwise been reluctant to do so. 95 The
process is useful because the government can circumvent political
issues involving accusations and avoid relying upon classified
information, but still open dialogue with the offending country.96 As
another example, the private sector can help the government monitor
compliance to agreements struck between nations.9 7 Cybersecurity
companies were instrumental in monitoring China's compliance with a
2015 agreement between China and the United States regarding cyber
theft of trade secrets.9 8
The private sector has enjoyed some success in protecting itself.
Some of the most successful examples of private and public sector
cooperation have been botnet takedowns. 99 Microsoft pioneered the
technique in 2010 when it took down the Waldec botnet.1 0 0 It was not
until over a year later that the US government, using tactics similar to

sites/1awjournalnewsletters/2017/02/0 1/cybersecurity-public-private-partnerships-challengesand-opportunities/ [https://perma.ce/48QH-R6GC].
See Pellerin, supra note 88.
92.
93.
See id.
See Eichensehr, supra note 87, at 490-91.
94.
See id. at 489.
95.
96.
See id. at 489 n.108.
97.
See id. at 492.
98.
See id.
See GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV., CTR. FOR CYBER & HOMELAND SEC., INTO THE GRAY
99.
ZONE: THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND ACTIVE DEFENSE AGAINST CYBER THREATS 12 (2016),

https://cchs.gwu.edulsites/cchs.gwu.edulfiles/downloads/CCHS-ActiveDefenseReportFINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8GGZ-8KBT] [hereinafter GRAY ZONE REPORT].
See Nick Wingfield & Ben Worthen, Microsoft Battles Cyber Criminals, WALL ST. J.
100.
12:45
PM),
26,
2010,
(Feb.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704240004575086523786147014
[https://perma.cc/8QS6-3KLK].
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Microsoft's, took down its first botnet.10 1 Since then, Microsoft has
collaborated with the FBI and federal police forceS1 02 in other countries
to take down many other nets. 103 M1crosoft has received criticism for its
participation in the operations;1 04 nevertheless, companies and the
government have embraced collaboration while taking down botnets,
creating a "new normal" for botnet removal.10 5
Another space in which governments and firms have been
teaming up, though not always in good moral conscience,10 6 is in the
acquisition of zero-day vulnerabilities. 10 7 Zero-day vulnerabilities are
vulnerabilities in a system that are unknown to the software vendor
and are therefore available for exploitation by whoever might know of
its existence. 108
Because the developers are unaware of the
vulnerability, they have yet to create a patch for it and all systems
running the software are targetable. 109 When seeking to acquire zero-

101.
See Eichensehr, supra note 87, at 480.
102.
See, e.g., Cory Bennett, Officials Break Up Global Ring of Im Infected Computers, HILL
(Dec. 4, 2015), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/262087-officials-break-up-global-ring-ofinfected-computers [https://perma.cc/FD8L-UEVJ] ("The FBI said Microsoft assisted the Dorkbot
takedown, which also included help from the European Cybercrime Center and the Interpol Digital
Crime Center.").
103.
See Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1-8, No. 1:14cv811 LOG/TCB, 2014 WL 12575722, at
*4-5 (E.D. Va. June 27, 2014) (enjoining defendants from operating the Shylock botnet); Microsoft
Corp. v. John Does 1-18, No. 1:13cv139 (LMB/TCB), 2014 WL 1338677, at *11 (E.D. Va. Apr. 2,
2014) (permanently enjoining defendants from operating the Bamital botnet); Microsoft Corp. v.
John Does 1-82, No. 3:13-cv-319, 2013 WL 2632612, at *5-6 (W.D.N.C. June 10, 2013) (enjoining
the defendants from operating the Citadel botnet); Bennett, supra note 102 (reporting that
Microsoft helped take down the "Dorkbot" botnet, which infected over one million computers in
190 countries); Jonathan Camhi, How Microsoft & FS-ISAC Are Attacking Malware Threats,
INFORMATIONWEEK: BANK SYS. & TECH. (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.banktech.com/security/howmicrosoft-and-fs-isac-are-attacking-malware-threats/d/d-id/1316382.htm
[https://perma.cc/5KFX-HR8A]; FBI and Microsoft Take Down $500m-Theft Botnet Citadel, BBC
(June 6, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-22795074 [https://perma.cc/TUV2-SY9H]
(reporting that Microsoft helped take down the "Citadel" botnet, which was responsible from
stealing more than $500 million from bank accounts and infected around five million machines).
104.
See Antone Gonsalves, Microsoft Criticizedfor Botnet Takedown Tactics, CSO ONLINE
(June
13, 2013),
https://www.csoonline.com/article/2133617/malware-cybercrime/microsoftcriticized-for-botnet-takedown-tactics.html [https://perma.cc/FD2J-XLUD].
105.
See Eichensehr, supra note 87, at 481; Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General
Leslie R. Caldwell Delivers Remarks at the Georgetown Cybersecurity Law Institute, U.S. DEP'T
JUST. (May 20, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speechlassistant-attorney-general-leslie-rcaldwell-delivers-remarks-georgetown-cybersecurity [https://perma.cc/F2KL-T5TY].
106.
See Eichensehr, supra note 87, at 483 ("[C]ompanies have built business models
selling not just to the U.S. government but also to other companies and governments around the
world, including governments with poor human rights records."). Even when obtained by the NSA,
the purpose of the acquisition is morally dubious. The agency is known to pay off software and
hardware companies to not disclose known vulnerabilities or backdoors so the NSA can continue
to exploit them. Id. at 485.
107.
See id. at 482-83.
108.
See id. at 482.
109.
See id.
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day vulnerabilities, the NSA either browses the black marketo to buy
vulnerabilities themselves, or pays other companies like defense
The
contractors to obtain vulnerabilities as an intermediary.11 1
112
Department of Defense has also placed a "bug bounty" on itself called
"Hack the Pentagon," a $150,000 program in which the government
paid private hackers to find and report over one hundred
vulnerabilities. 113
The public-private cybersecurity strategy is not without its
flaws, the first of which is the private sector's loose commitment to
sharing information with the government. While corporations have
been generally willing to share information after a breach has
occurred, 114 their willingness to share information before consumer data
has been compromised is questionable. 115 Illustrative of this issue is
the abysmal corporate participation rate with the Department of
Homeland Security's Cyber Information Sharing and Collaboration
Program. 116 Namely, as of October 2016, only one of the 140
organizations connected to the system shared any significant amount of
information. 117 An ideal system would prevent firms' systems from
being compromised in the first instance. It is of little comfort to the
consumer when corporations seek government assistance only after the
consumer's sensitive information has been stolen. Similarly, intuition
suggests that it would be less efficient to remedy an economic crash
caused by the loss of a major financial institution than it would be to
prevent that loss initially.
See id. Sometimes the vulnerabilities market is labeled as the "gray market" since
110.
buyers and sellers are presumptively conscionable actors, though that is not always the case. Id.
at 483.
111.
See id. at 482-83.
Id. at 488. A bug bounty is a program through which entities invite white-hat hackers
112.
to attempt to breach the firm's systems in hopes that the hackers will find and report the bugs to
the

firm

in

exchange

for

a

cash

reward.

See

Bug

Bounty,

TECHOPEDIA,

(last
[https://perma.cc/K59J-X69R]
https://www.techopedia.com/definition/28637/bug-bounty
visited Oct. 5, 2018).
See Lisa Ferdinando, Carter Announces 'Hack the Pentagon'Program Results, U.S.
113.
DEP'T DEF. (June 17, 2016), https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/802828/carterannounces-hack-the-pentagon-program-results/ [https://perma.cc/AB2M-HDVN].
See Pellerin, supra note 88. For example, Sony "had no issue at all" in providing the
114.
NSA access to their networks after they were hacked in 2014 by North Korea. Id.
See id. During his talk at the Wall Street Journal's CEO Council annual meeting,
115.
then-Navy Admiral Michael S. Rogers took a poll as to whether the CEOs in attendance trusted
the government enough to work with them during a cyberattack; 34 percent said 'only if their
company was attacked' and 9 percent said 'never.' Id. The survey, admittedly with sample size and
selection issues, demonstrates that at least a noninsignificant number of corporate CEOs would
not proactively volunteer to work with the government to prevent breaches.

See Eastman, supra note 69, at 549.
116.
Robert Lemos, Cyber-Threat DataSharing Off to Slow Start Despite U.S. Legislation,
117.
EWEEK (Oct. 2, 2016), http://www.eweek.com/security/cyber-threat-data-sharing-off-to-slow-startdespite-u.s.-legislation [https://perma.cc/4NSH-VCVN].
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The second flaw in the public-private cybersecurity system
concerns consumer safety more than critical infrastructure. It is one of
tangled public law values-chiefly, the lack of accountability and
transparency.1 1 8
The private sector is not beholden to the same
transparency standards by which the government carries out its
cybersecurity policies. 119
Without such mechanisms, private
cybersecurity policies are entirely opaque-preventing concurrent
public oversight and eliminating the possibility of ongoing
accountability. 120
One could argue that while the public-private strategy lacks
ongoing accountability, private actors face accountability via
retroactive means such as market reactions or private lawsuits. 12 1
However, the efficacy of such retroactive accountability is dubious. A
2016 study by RAND Corporation found that after a firm has been
breached, only 11 percent of respondents stopped shopping with that
firm. 12 2 The RAND study contends "[t]hat the overwhelming majority
of consumers (89 percent) continue to do business with the breached
company appears to provide little incentive for the company to change
its behavior, especially with regard to cybersecurity protection or
defenses." 123 Because private actors have largely escaped currently
available accountability mechanisms, 124 consumer data is at risk.
While it would be extreme to require private firms to publicly disclose
all information on their security measures, an improved accountability
system would need to be implemented to adequately protect consumer
information in the first instance.
B. Militarized Cybersecurity
The second possible solution is for the military to assume
responsibility for defending all US cyberspace. Unlike the widespread
support for a public-private cybersecurity partnership scheme, support
for militarized cybersecurity has been almost non-existent in academic

118.
119.
120.
121.

See
See
See
See

Eichensehr, supra note 87, at 511-12.
id. at 515.
id. at 512-14.
id. at 513-14.

122.
LILLIAN ABLON ET AL., RAND CORP., CONSUMER ATTITUDES TOWARD DATA BREACH
NOTIFICATIONS AND LOSS OF PERSONAL INFORMATION 26 (2016).

123.
Id. at 27. A counterargument is that the apathetic consumer response suggests that a
change in cyber regime is not needed since consumers do not care that their information was
breached. This argument ignores the fact that, in practice, switching firms might be prohibitively
costly. See id. at 26.
124.
See Eichensehr, supra note 87, at 514.
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legal literature and lackluster at best among government officials. 125
That is not to say that this approach has been entirely unsupported. In
early 2017, then President-elect Donald Trump "called for stepped-up
efforts to combat cyber-crime and protect critical infrastructure,
including greater involvement by the Defense Department."1 2 6
There are conceptual reasons as to why some might call for a
militarized approach-the vulnerabilities and increased importance of
critical infrastructure1 2 7 are often cited as the next frontier in the
evolution of warfare 128 -but no argument in favor of militarized
cybersecurity for the private sector serves to alleviate the many flaws
this approach presents. First, it is currently structurally impossible to
to corporate
militarized approach
implement a completely
cybersecurity. Although the US government implemented rigorous
defenses for its own systems and seeks to disrupt criminal activity in
cyberspace, 129 "no element of the U.S. Government, including the
military, has adequate organization or resources to meet the challenge
of defending American economic interests in cyberspace."1 3 0
Second, the US public is uncomfortable with the idea that the
government monitors too much personal information. 131 A national
See Sean Lawson, Is the United States MilitarizingCyberspace?,FORBES (Nov. 2, 2012,
125.
6:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/seanlawson/2012/11/02/is-the-united-states-militarizingcyberspace/#261f7263798d [https://perma.cc/RBV4-LWBY]. In 2010, for example, Senator John
McCain called for the Department of Defense to assume a greater role in national cybersecurity,
but his call was resisted by General Keith Alexander, then-Commander of the United States Cyber
Command. See id.

Paul Merrion, McCaul Says Pentagon Role in Civilian Cybersecurity Would Be a
126.
'Mistake', CQ ROLL CALL (Jan. 12, 2017) (2017 WL 115625). House Homeland Security Chairman
Michael McCaul was quick to dismiss the idea as a mistake. See id.
See supra notes 27-44 and accompanying text.
127.
See, e.g., Lin, supra note 28, at 1381 ("[Critical infrastructure] presents an extremely
128.
valuable battle space for our adversaries because they may be able to plunder funds for their efforts
and cause widespread financial panic and crisis simultaneously. Unlike Wartime theaters, the
financial theater of war is less defined by geography and more by its critical functions, assets, and
liabilities.") (footnote omitted).
129.

See

U.S.

DEP'T

OF

HOMELAND

SEC.,

CYBERSECURITY

STRATEGY

3

(2018),

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS-Cybersecurity-Strategy_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/43U8- E967].
Matteo G. Martemucci, Unpunished Insults-The Looming Cyber Barbary Wars, 47
130.
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 53, 60 (2015).
See Mary Madden, Americans'Views on Government Surveillance Programs,PEW RES.
131.
CTR.: INTERNET & TECH. (Mar.

16, 2015),

http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/03/16/americans-

views-on-government-surveillance-programs/ [https://perma.cc/JXL8-ZAZY]. Fifty-two percent of
Americans were either "very concerned" or "somewhat concerned" about the government's
surveillance of Americans' data and electronic communications. Id. Further, while Americans are
comfortable with surveilling others, only 40 percent of the people polled thought it was acceptable
to monitor ordinary US citizens. Id. Moreover, individuals maintain a strong expectation of privacy
against government intrusions in personal records, as well as information stored "into a
corporation's computer." See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at
"UnderstandingsRecognized and Permitted by Society", 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 762 (1993).
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debate regarding the acceptable amount of personal data collected by
the government ensued after Edward Snowden leaked the quantity and
type of data collected by the NSA's PRISM program. 132 As a military
support agency and part of the Department of Defense, 13 3 the NSA's
collection of data for PRISM is analogous to military collection of data
for cybersecurity, as both would be by the military for the sake of
national defense. Because the government needs full access to a firm's
networks and data to monitor its cybersecurity, 13 4 the public would
likely raise privacy concerns similar to those raised regarding the
government's PRISM program. 135
Finally, the militarization of cyber defense could raise
international law concerns, especially if the government engaged in
"hacking back" 13 6 or other more aggressive active defenses when the
aggressor is a foreign nation. 137 In a worst-case scenario, the
government's potential mismanagement of private sector cybersecurity
could justify a physical armed response from another nation. 138 Though

132.
Edward Snowden revealed that the NSA could directly access the systems of "internet
giants" to obtain data on consumers. See Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism
ProgramTaps in to User Data of Apple, Google, and Others, GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013, 3:23 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data

[https://perma.cc/68NN-

WTJU]; T.C. Sottek & Janus Kopfstein, Everything You Need to Know About PRISM: A Cheat
Sheet for the NSA's Unprecedented Surveillance Programs, VERGE (July 17, 2013, 1:36 PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2013/7/17/4517480/nsa-spying-prism-surveillance-cheat-sheet
[https://perma.cc/47S8-J7ZX]. As a result of the revelations, debate engulfed Congress about the
legality of the data collections, private parties challenged the program in courts, and "Restore the
Fourth" rallies were held in over one hundred cities on July 4, 2013. See Sottek & Kopfstein, supra.
133.
See Support to the Military, U.S. NAT'L SECURITY AGENCY (May 3, 2016),
https://www.nsa.gov/what-we-do/support-the-military/
[https://perma.ccYZ4B-7B8Z]
("The
National Security Agency is part of the U.S. Department of Defense, serving as a combat support
agency. Supporting our military service members around the world is one of the most important
things that we do.").
134.
See Pellerin, supra note 88.
135.
See Martemucci, supra note 130, at 60 (stating that "deep concern" by the public over
perceptions of the NSA in the wake of Snowden leaks would further complicate military control of
private-sector cybersecurity); President Obama's Dragnet, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/opinion/president-obamas-dragnet.html
[https://perma.cc/FS7R-X3ME] ("Mr. Obama is proving the truism that the executive branch will
use any power it is given and very likely to abuse it.").
136.
"Hacking back" is defined as conducting operations intended to destroy external
networks or information. GRAY ZONE REPORT, supra note 99, at 10.

137.
See U.N. Charter art. 2, 1 4. Hacking back is likely permissible as self-defense if the
first breach counts as an "armed attack," but no standard of practical use exists that defines when
a cyber operation rises to that level. See Michael N. Schmitt, Peacetime Cyber Responses and
Wartime Cyber Operations Under InternationalLaw: An Analytical Vade Mecum, 8 HARV. NAT'L
SECURITY J. 239, 244, 246 (2017) ("[T]he answer lies in the 'scale and effects' of the operation, a
standard drawn from the Nicaraguajudgment. Unfortunately, the standard is, albeit accurate as
a matter of law, of little practical use.") (footnote omitted).
138.
See Schmitt, supra note 137, at 245 ("[W]hen a state is the target of harmful cyber
operations that rise to the level of an armed attack, it may respond with kinetic or cyber operations
that would otherwise constitute prohibited uses of force in violation of article 2(4) of the UN
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cybersecurity is important to defend, a militarized approach is
structurally and politically inefficient to a degree that fatally
undermines any argument in its favor.
C. Regulated Cybersecurity
Rather than act as partner to facilitate cybersecurity in the
public-private partnership model, or usurp total control of cybersecurity
measures in the militarized system, the third solution is for the
government to pass legislation requiring adequate cybersecurity
measures from firms. Legislatures have called for and passed such
statutes, in at least a minor form, in nearly all states,1 39 but similar
statutes have gained little ground in the federal government.140
Specifically, New York 41 and Californial 42 state legislatures have taken
the lead to enact more comprehensive legislation.
The legislative landscape concerning cybersecurity regulation is
a patchwork of rules enacted mostly by states.14 3 Many federal agencies
also seek to regulate cyber defenses in some capacity for industries
within their fields. Section I.C discusses the FTC's attempts under 15
U.S.C. §45(n). 144 Other regulatory agencies that have promulgated
regulations in this realm include the Department of Health and Human
Services, 14 5 the Federal Communications Commission,14 6 the Federal

Charter and its customary international law counterpart."). For more information on when and

how a cyberattack might rise to the level of an "armed attack," see id. at 245-46.
See Brian Neil Hoffman et al., Federaland State Cybersecurity Regulation of Financial
139.
2017),
(June
NEWSLS.
L.J.
Firms,
Services
http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/sites/lawjournalnewsletters/2017/06/01/federal-and-state-

cybersecurity-regulation-of-financial-services-firms/?slreturn=20180118161409
[https://perma.cc/YE5N-V9AD] ("46 other states, Washington, DC, and three U.S. territories have
enacted similar laws [to California's general breach notification law].").
See Wooten, supra note 67, at 239.
140.
See Cybersecurity Requirements for Financial Services Companies, N.Y. COMP. CODES
141.
R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 500 (2017).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5(b) (West 2016). California law requires any "business that
142.
owns, licenses, or maintains personal information about a California resident [to] implement and
maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the

information, to protect the personal information" from disclosure. Id. In February 2016, thenCalifornia Attorney General Kamala Harris issued a report that stated that "reasonable security
procedures" for all organizations that collect or maintain personal information requires adherence

to the twenty controls in the Center for Internet Security's Critical Security Controls. KAMALA D.
HARRIS, CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CALIFORNIA DATA BREACH REPORT 30 (2016).

See Forscey et al., supranote 15.
143.
See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
144.
See Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8,334, 8,334 (Feb. 20,
145.
2003) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 162, 164).
See Federal Communications Act, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as
146.
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.).
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Energy Regulatory Commission, 147 and the Securities and Exchange
Commission.148 A benefit to comprehensive, federally promulgated
cybersecurity rules is that they would bring much needed clarity to the
current landscape, called for by both stateS 149 and businesses.15 0 A
comprehensive rule would also help solve the oversight issue identified
within the public-private partnership model; though businesses have
not been reactive to market pressures, the government could write
procedures which would facilitate oversight into the rule.
An unfortunate reality-and a major flaw for regulating
cybersecurity-is that because organizations vary in threats faced and
data held, "[there is] no one-size-fits-all approach to managing
cybersecurity risk." 15 1 To mandate that all companies use certain
systems or firewalls with specific requirements would be both over and
underinclusive;
overinclusive
because
mandatory
minimum
requirements might be prohibitively expensive for small businesses
with relatively no risk for breaches, and underinclusive because it is
highly unlikely the standards promulgated would cover all types of
breaches or defenses.
Assuming that a universal approach was even practical,
cybersecurity is a fast-moving, readily evolving industry, whereas
Congress is decidedly neither fast-moving nor readily evolving. 152 Even
when a single party controls the House, Senate, and Presidency-such
as the legal landscape as of the time of writing-laws are passed at
tectonic speed. 153 Further complicating matters, Congress lacks the

147.
See Federal Power Act, Pub. L. No. 333, 49 Stat. 847 (1935) (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. § 824).
148.
Companies must disclose cybersecurity risks to comply with the Securities Act of 1933
and '34. See CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 2, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Oct. 13,
2011),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm
[https://perma.cc/P2A8-D3C6].
149.
See Colin Wood, States Push Feds to 'Harmonize'Cybersecurity Regulations in 2018,
STATESCOOP (Jan. 19, 2018, 6:06 PM), http://statescoop.com/states-push-feds-to-harmonizecybersecurity-regulations-in-2018 [https://perma.cc/5PFV-MBFL].
150.
See Catalina E. Azuero, CyberSecurity Regulation Back on Center Stage after Data
Breach, GOODWIN (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.lenderlawwatch.com/2017/09/21/cybersecurityregulation-back-on-center-stage-after-data-breach/ [https://perma.cc/6XQJ-HP6W]. A letter to
Congress by various industry trade groups argued for a national law on data breach notification,
which would preempt the existing patchwork. See id.
151.
See Arias, supra note 74.
152.
See Adrien Seybert, Net 'ParadigmShift'for Slow-Moving Congress, WIRED (Mar. 7,
1997, 7:30 PM), https://www.wired.com1997/03/net-paradigm-shift-for-slow-moving-congress
[https://perma.cclPY76-ZWUP].
153.
See Scott Simon, Conservative Donors Grow Frustratedwith Congress Over Slow
Legislative
Progress,
NPR
(Oct.
21,
2017,
8:12
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2017/10/21/5592 15243/conservative-donors-grow-frustrated-with-congressover-slow-legislative-progress [https://perma.cc/K8H3-3WPT].
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policies
cybersecurity
understand
to
required
expertise 54
comprehensively enough to appropriately legislate. Said structural
deficiencies partially explain why Congress has yet to pass even
statutes that seem widely supported, such as a data breach notification
requirement.15 5

III. SOLUTION
The strategies discussed in Part II outline the goals for a better
cybersecurity landscape. First, the ideal security landscape would be
standardized and centralized to reduce the costs of compliance and
eliminate confusion for firms and states attempting to navigate
regulations. Second, private firms should be in charge of their own
systems and concurrently held accountable for their security practices.
Third, select information pertaining to cybersecurity should be readily
shared with the government, but the firms and consumers should
monitor which data is released to reduce the chance of government
abuse or misuse. Finally, the system must be flexible enough to avoid
forcing a one-size-fits-all framework while being rigorous enough to
place consumer protection above other considerations.
Repeated failure by private firms to protect consumer data
demands change. Because firms elect to acquire and maintain vast
deposits of consumer data, 15 6 the cost for its protection ought to reside
primarily with the firm, rather than the public. For that reason, the
ideal solution would be one that imposes mandatory compliance upon
firms rather than attempting to incentivize increased cooperation with
the government. 15 7 With mandatory compliance in mind, the best

154.

See James M. Curry, To Be Effective Legislators, Members of Congress Need Expert

2015),
1,
(May
NETWORK
STRATEGY
SCHOLARS
Own,
of
Their
Resources
http://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org/brief/be-effective-legislators-members-congress-needto
Expert resources available
[https://perma.cc/8VLP-LUDQ].
expert-resources-their-own

Congress for members to learn about the legislations they are debating have declined since the
1970s. See id.
All fifty states passed legislation requiring entities to notify individuals of security
155.
breaches of information involving personally identifiable information. See Security Breach
Notification

Laws,

NAT'L

CONF.

ST.

LEGISLATURES

(Oct.

2018),

7,

http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breachnotification-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/3THD-M85R]. Congress is considering a similar provision,
the "Data Security and Breach Notification Act," but, as of writing, little progress has been made.
See Data Security and Breach Notification Act, S. 2179, 115th Cong. § 3(a) (2017); Ted Knutson,
Congress Ratcheting Up Pressure on Companies to Notify Consumers of Data Breaches Sooner,

FORBES (Feb. 14, 2018, 1:16 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tedknutson/2018/02/14/congressratcheting-up-pressure-on-companies-to-notify-consumers-of-data-breaches-sooner/#4f7

2 2 2

f

558df

[https://perma.cc/7TRD-7BAF].
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
156.
But see Lin, supra note 28, at 1427-31 (suggesting that policymakers can use tax
157.
policy to provide corporate tax incentives that encourage companies to invest in better security-
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method by which the United States can achieve a system that meets the
four requirements outlined above is the creation of a single
administrative agency, which would assume all authority regarding
cybersecurity regulation.1 58 For simplicity's sake, this proposed agency
will be referred to as the "Cyber Agency" throughout the remainder of
this Note.
A single central agency, as opposed to the current regulatory
landscape in which multiple agencies have unclear, piecemeal authority
over cybersecurity regulations, is vital for three reasons. First, an
agency dedicated solely to cybersecurity regulations would be more
assured about its authority to regulate and could avoid concerns of
mission overreach held by other regulatory agencies. 15 9 This is
especially important given that the-FTC is currently heavily involved
in cybersecurity regulations based on preventing "unfairness" 1 60 but
has faced unfairness-related overreach criticisms in the past. 16 1 With a
congressional grant of authority, the Cyber Agency would be more likely
to receive Chevron deference for its cybersecurity rulings and remove
concerns regarding other agencies overstepping its authority. 162
A single agency would also address concerns regarding a lack of
adaptability or expertise present for laws passed through the legislative
process. Agencies promulgate regulations much faster and with higher
frequency than Congress can legislate, 163 and a singular agency can

preferring government contract offers to firms that meet security standards and subsidizing whitehat firm expenditures to purchase zero-day exploits). See id. The main distinction between Lin's
argument and the one presented here is that Lin's argument is focused on the government's duty
to protect the nation from other states' warlike efforts, whereas this Note is focused on firms' duty
to protect those people off of whom firms profit. See id. at 1378 ("This Article descriptively and
normatively explores the new financial theater of war . . . and proposes key recommendations for
current and future financial warfare.").

158.
For a similar argument, see Balitzer, supra note 66, at 917-18. The arguments
presented here differ chiefly from Balitzer's in that this Note's argument is predicated on a single
agency, rather than a joint effort by the FCC and Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center.
This Note calls for flexible, nuanced applications of security standards instead of Balitzer's
"extensive minimum-security standards." See id. at 916-18.
159.
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A), (C) (2018) ("The reviewing court shall hold unlawful and set
aside agency action . .. found to be . . . an abuse of discretion, . . . in excess of statutory jurisdiction,

authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right . . . ."); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency
Coordinationin Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1134 (2012).
160.
See Eastman, supra note 69, at 536-37.
161.
See Beales, supra note 79.
162.
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A), (C); JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH
INTRODUCTION TO JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCY ACTION 2 (2016).

SERV., AN

163.
See Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., How Many Rules and Regulations Do Federal Agencies
Issue?,
FORBES
(Aug.
15,
2017,
12:48
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/waynecrews/2017/08/15/how-many-rules-and-regulations-dofederal-agencies-issue/#lebcbc791e64 [https://perma.cc/C6AL-JCCG]. From 1995 through 2016,
agencies promulgated almost ninety thousand total rules, whereas Congress enacted 4,312 laws.
Id.
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specialize in cybersecurity, allowing it to obtain the expertise necessary
to promulgate satisfactory regulations. The ideas of expertise and
efficiency similarly support the proposition of creating a new agency to
regulate cybersecurity rather than granting an existing agency, say the
FTC, the authority to regulate. The FTC could tackle cybersecurity
regulation, but then it would have to either hire more people or use its
current staff. If the FTC hired more people, the agency would bloat,
take more to manage, and could possibly slow from bureaucratic
inefficiencies. If the FTC instead worked with people already in the
agency, it risks sacrificing the benefits gained from expertise in
cybersecurity. The FTC regulates a broad field of issues, potentially
preventing it from obtaining the high level of expertise necessary to
create properly nuanced and evolving rules.
Finally, leaving cybersecurity regulations to multiple agencies
would fail to reduce the costs of compliance associated with following
laws and regulations by multiple governing bodies--one of the core
concerns of an optimal security landscape. When creating the Cyber
Agency, Congress could grant the Cyber Agency exclusive control over
cybersecurity regulations. In this way, the Cyber Agency could act as a
repository for all cybersecurity-related rules, untangling the patchwork
of regulations promulgated by other agencies. The Cyber Agency's rules
would also help to partially alleviate the state patchwork of regulations
by preempting state regulations in conflict with those promulgated by
the Cyber Agency. 164 Should Congress establish an express or field
5
preemption over state cybersecurity regulations,16 businesses will
incur lower costs for compliance when needing to satisfy only one
agency's regulations rather than looking to multiple agencies' and
states' rules.
The second goal for an ideal cybersecurity landscape is that
private firms oversee their own systems but are concurrently held
accountable for their security practices. The Cyber Agency satisfies this
66
through
requirement by acting as a vehicle for public oversight1

See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
164.
Preemption is express when "Congress states clearly in a federal law that it intends
165.
to supersede related state laws." Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students (Sponsored by
11:05 AM),
(Mar. 11, 2013,
Bloomberg Law): Preemption Again, SCOTUSBLOG
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/03/scotus-for-law-students-sponsored-by-bloomberg-lawpreemption-again/ [https://perma.cc/A9LV-3S2U]. Field preemption applies when Congress
legislates in a way that is so comprehensive that it occupies the entire field of an issue. Id.
Public oversight would be achieved partially through the notice and comment
166.
rulemaking procedures, mandated by the Administrative Procedures Act before an administrative
agency passes any binding rules. See Brian Wolfman & Bradley Girard, Argument Preview: The
Administrative Procedure Act,

SCOTUSBLOG

(Nov.

26,

Notice-and-Comment Rule Making, and "Interpretive" Rules,

2014,

10:13

AM),

http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/11/argument-

previewthe-administrative-procedure-act-notice-and-comment-rule-making-and-interpretive-
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regulations without usurping network control. Possible regulations
could require firms to maintain audit trails of their responses to
potential risks, 167 conduct regular penetration testing, 168 or provide
regular reports to the agency about security updates.
This system of accountability is not without its flaws. Critics
might argue that the stringency of the agency's monitoring rules would
largely depend upon executive branch policies, or that the agency could
face issues of regulatory capture in the likely event that interested
firms participate more extensively than the public in the Cyber
Agency's notice and comment proceedings. 169 The public's control over
the executive branch and the public's history of notice and comment
participation when motivated partially alleviate these misgivings. 170
The agency would additionally be subject to Congressional and judicial
oversight. Despite potential flaws, monitoring by the Cyber Agency is
the most workable option for concurrent monitoring when the
alternative systems, as discussed in Part II, are ineffective as a whole
or provide virtually no concurrent oversight.17 1
The third goal for an ideal system calls for maximizing securityrelated information sharing-both between corporations and between
rules/ [https://perma.cc/CDJ4-MWRY]. The procedures require any agency seeking to promulgate
a binding rule to submit the proposed rule to the public and consider publicly submitted comments
on the rule. Id.
167.
See Cybersecurity Requirements for Financial Services Companies, N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 500.006 (2017).
168.
The tests could be administered by the Cyber Agency or other external companies,
similar to an external audit. See Lin, supra note 28, at 1431-32. The Department of Homeland
Security's National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center provides a precedent
for agency-administered testing. See Jason Miller, How DHS Hacks Agency Networks to Make
Them Stronger, More Resilient, FED. NEWS RADIO (Dec.
6, 2017,
8:07 AM),
https://federalnewsradio.com/cybersecurity/20 17/12/how-dhs-hacks-agency-networks-to-makethem-stronger-more-resilient/ [https://perma.cc/52S3-NJUD]. Penetration testing has the further
benefit of already being standard practice for the government and some financial institutions. See
Lin, supra note 28, at 1432.
169.
See Lawrence G. Baxter, UnderstandingRegulatory Capture:An Academic Perspective
from the United States, in THE MAKING OF GOOD FINANCIAL REGULATION: TOWARDS A POLICY
RESPONSE TO REGULATORY CAPTURE 31, 31-32 (2012); HENRIQUE SCHNEIDER, UBER: INNOVATION

IN SOCIETY 65 (2017) ("[R]egulatory capture ...
is the process by which regulatory agencies
eventually come to be dominated by the very industries they were charged with regulating.").
170.
Although the most recent fight over net neutrality was clouded by controversy
concerning the true extent of the public's comments, the FCC's consideration of net neutrality rules
in 2014 fueled millions of scandal-free comments by consumers interested in making themselves
heard. See Brian Naylor, As FCC Prepares Net-Neutrality Vote, Study Finds Millions of Fake
Comments, NPR (Dec. 14, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/12/14/570262688/as-fccprepares-net-neutrality-vote-study-finds-millions-of-fake-comments
[https://perma.cc/AT6HTWTY] ("Some 22 million public comments have been filed with the Federal Communications
Commission .... But, it turns out, much of that public input is not what it appears."); Marguerite
Reardon, Net Neutrality: How We Got from There to Here, CNET (Feb. 24, 2015, 4:00 AM),
https://www.cnet.com/news/net-neutrality-from-there-to-here/ [https://perma.cc/6GD4-AC84] ("In
total, more than 4 million public comments were filed on the [2014] Net neutrality proposal.").
171.
See supra Part II.
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the private sector and the government-while minimizing risk of
governmental abuse. This is important because the accountability the
second goal calls for requires a metric reflecting data-sharing activity
and cooperation by the firms. To achieve this, the Cyber Agency could
borrow from the Department of Homeland Security and implement an
information-sharing program, 172 but simply make active participation
mandatory.1 7 3 Mandatory disclosure of data might make the public
uneasy, but-just as the Cyber Agency can act as the public's vehicle to
monitor private sector cybersecurity-so, too, can firms act as the
public's vehicle to monitor the Cyber Agency for appropriate data usage
and application. The Cyber Agency could limit the type of information
it requires from businesses. For example, the information shared could
be limited to information about the corporation's cyber infrastructure,
such as vulnerabilities discovered and methods used to patch them, or
the attacks detected and any identifying marks gleaned from the
hackers. To ensure these limitations are respected, private firms could
publish reports about the type of data they give to the Cyber Agency.
The Cyber Agency could simultaneously file public reports on the types
of metrics the agency requires from the private sector. If citizens notice
that the Cyber Agency is mandating disclosure of personal information
rather than just cybersecurity statistics, they can lobby the agency or
Congress for change. Transparencies about and limitations on the data
collected from firms ought to help ease misgivings about data abuse by
the government.
Finally, a single agency is the best method by which a nuanced
structure of regulations can be enacted to ensure consumer data are
protected while avoiding blanket regulations. As previously discussed,
a one-size-fits-all approach to cybersecurity is realistically
impracticable.17 4 The Cyber Agency's expertise and dedication to
cybersecurity regulation would enable it to create metrics ensuring
appropriate minimum security standards, not simply sufficient ones.
Single-store mom and pop shops who collect credit card information
from their customers ought not be subjected to the same minimum
requirements as national financial institutions or power plants whose
networks qualify as critical infrastructure. Small businesses are far
from exempt from cyberattacks, but they can take relatively
straightforward steps to protect themselves, like watching out for

See Cyber Information Sharingand CollaborationProgram (CISCP), supranote 72.
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Enforcing such a program would be admittedly difficult, but possible, if combined with
173.
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See Arias, supra note 74; supra Section II.C.
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phishing expeditions.1 75 Critical infrastructure, which by its nature is
largely interconnected, 1 7 6 might require more thorough and costly
measures to protect its data.
Similarly, as between two large
companies, those which collect only credit card information should not
be subject to the same standards as those who also collect addresses,
driver's license numbers, and social security numbers since the
potential damage caused by a breach of the former would be less than
a breach of the latter. The Cyber Agency could use the information
gleaned through the concurrent accountability reporting requirements
to ensure the riskiest businesses are held to the strictest standards
while relatively risk-free firms are not bogged down by unnecessary
regulation. The assessment would focus on each firm's risk of being
hacked and the potential damage a breach would cause to the public.
The Cyber Agency's flexibility while regulating also allows the
public to consider who they think ought to bear the cost of protections.
This Note argues that firms who collect and sell consumer data purely
for profit ought to carry the burden to protect that information. The
argument becomes less straightforward, however, when considering
who should pay to protect the networks of public utility companies or
financial institutions, like the New York Stock Exchange, which are
considered critical infrastructure. Should the public decide the cost to
defend critical infrastructure rightfully belongs to the government, the
Cyber Agency could still mandate appropriate security requirements
but offer incentives or subsidies in the event of compliance to offset the
cost.
An example regulation is illustrative. If the Cyber Agency is
created, it could require that companies disclose the type and quantity
of information collected from their customers. The Cyber Agency might
then decide to require penetration testing for companies whose stored
information is of sufficient value or sensitivity (i.e., the credit card
information of at least three hundred thousand customers or the credit
card and social security information of at least one hundred thousand
customers). The determination for the minimum information stored
before penetration testing is required could be a cost-benefit analysis:
balancing the cost of penetration testing compared to the expected
damage from a breach, calculated as the potential damage of losing the
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See Chris Morris, 14 Million US Businesses Are at Risk of a Hacker Threat, CNBC
(July 25, 2017, 10:02 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/25/14-million-us-businesses-are-at-riskof-a-hacker-threat.html [https://perma.cc/7WRP-H8Y5]; Steve Strauss, Cyber Threat is Huge for
Small
Businesses,
USA
TODAY
(Oct.
20,
2017,
10:33
AM),
https://www.usatoday.comlstory/money/columnist/strauss/2017/10/20/cyber-threat-huge-smallbusinesses/782716001/ [https://perma.cclBY7R-GRHD].
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stored information times the likelihood that the information would be
lost. From the results of penetration testing, the Cyber Agency might
find that for many corporations, security would be improved by
updating their physical defenses. The Cyber Agency therefore might
promulgate a rule that requires corporations to install gateways,17 7
segmented system memory, 178 and hack-proof wireless routers.1 7 9 To
determine the extent to which hardware upgrades will be required, the
Cyber Agency could conduct another cost-benefit analysis, this time
comparing the cost of installing the hardware to the value of the
information expected to be protected once the hardware is installed.
The Cyber Agency could carve out exceptions to the requirement for
companies whose security would see little benefit from installationknowledge to be gleaned from the penetration tests-or for companies
whose stored data is not valuable enough to warrant the additional cost
for protections. If the public decides that the cost to defend critical
infrastructure belongs to the federal government, the Cyber Agency
might also include cost-shifting measures to assume some of the
financial burden of installation for public utility companies who are
required to upgrade their hardware. In this way, the Cyber Agency's
dedication and expertise to cybersecurity allow them to promulgate .a
tailored and effective rule to ensure appropriate protections over
consumer data.
It is important to note that the Cyber Agency's creation and
promulgated regulations would supplement the current public-private
partnership system. The public-private system became the de-facto
cybersecurity strategy because it features some benefits.1 80 The Cyber
See Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to Cyberattacks: A
177.
Justificationfor the Use of Active Defenses Against States Who Neglect Their Duty to Prevent, 201
MIL. L. REV. 1, 24 n.152 (2009). Gateways serve to restrict all data flowing in and out of the server
to one channel which can be monitored to ensure the traffic is for legitimate purposes and from
trustworthy sources. See id. One could analogize a computer gateway to a single gated access road
leading onto a campus from the highway.
See id. at 24. Segmented system memory works by storing privileged processes on one
178.
server drive and nonprivileged processes on others. Id. at 24 n.151.
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Agency is meant to address the flaws inherent in the public-private
partnership-chiefly issues of accountability1 81 and corporate
apathyl 82-without completely supplanting it. Indeed, the increased
information sharing between corporations and reduced confusion
surrounding what measures are required by the Cyber Agency would
likely increasethe private sector's effectiveness in protecting itself.
IV. CONCLUSION

Deficiencies in cybersecurity are and will continue to be a
problem, especially as nation-states ramp up their presence in
cyberspace and increase their utilization of sponsored hacks as a tool to
further their political agendas. Beyond government-owned networks,
consumer data and critical infrastructure owned by private firms also
face substantial risks.
Data and critical networks are currently
protected by a public-private partnership system which, though
effective in some regards, features a lack of oversight and accountability
by relying on ex ante private sector cooperation. It is this system which
has allowed over half of the citizens in the United States to have
compromised social security numbers and public utility systems to be
held for ransom.
A single dedicated agency is the best solution to remedy these
failings while avoiding concerns regarding privacy and data abuse, cost
and practicality, and regulatory rigidity present in other cybersecurity
strategies. The agency could centralize regulations to reduce costs of
compliance incurred by firms to determine necessary security
standards. Firms could retain control over their own networks, held
concurrently accountable by the agency's oversight. A centralized
agency could facilitate data sharing between firms and the government
while avoiding fears of misuse. Finally, the regulations promulgated by
the agency can be tailored in a way to avoid a one-size-fits-all approach.
It is through this system that the current cybersecurity landscape can
be shored up to give individual consumers peace of mind about the
integrity of their data and the nation a sense of assurance that it will
be protected from attacks against critical infrastructure.
Eric J. Hyla'
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